Abstract Given a labelled transition system G partially observed by an attacker, and a regular predicate Sec over the runs of G, enforcing opacity of the secret Sec in G means computing a supervisory controller K such that an attacker who observes a run of the controlled system K/G cannot ascertain that the trace of this run belongs to Sec based on the knowledge of G and K. We lift the problem from a single labelled transition system G to the class of all labelled transition systems specified by a Modal Transition System M . The lifted problem is to compute the maximally permissive controller K such that Sec is opaque in K/G for every labelled transition system G which is a model of M . The situations of the attacker and of the controller are asymmetric: at run time, the attacker may fully know G and K whereas the controller knows only M and the sequence of actions executed so far by the unknown G. We address the problem in two cases. Let Σ a denote the set of actions that can be observed by the attacker, and let Σ c and Σ o denote the sets of actions that can be controlled and observed by the controller, respectively. We provide optimal and regular controllers that enforce the opacity of regular secrets when Σ c ⊆ Σ o ⊆ Σ a = Σ. We provide optimal and regular controllers that enforce the opacity of regular upper-closed secrets (Sec = Sec.Σ * ) under the following assumptions: (i) Σ a ⊆ Σ c ⊆ Σ o = Σ or (ii) Σ a , Σ c ⊆ Σ o = Σ and wσ ∈ Sec ⇒ w ∈ Sec for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c .
Introduction
The concept of opacity, first introduced in the context of sessions of security protocols [13, 12] , was later extended to transition systems [3] . A predicate over the runs of a transition system is opaque w.r.t. an observation function if every observation produced by a run that satisfies the predicate is also produced by some run that does not satisfy the predicate. The concept of opacity is very flexible as it depends both on the class of predicates and on the observation function. By adjusting these two parameters, many common security properties (e.g., confidentiality, anonymity) can be rephrased in terms of opacity [3, 10] . In general, opacity is undecidable but this property may be checked effectively when it is applied to regular predicates on runs of finite transition systems and with observation functions induced by projection operators. Algorithms for checking opacity in Discrete Event Systems (DES) are presented together with applications in [18, 20, 10 ].
An active and hot topic at the frontier of the theories of security and DES is the search for supervisory controllers that enforce the opacity of a predicate on a given transition system. As noted in [8] , long-term motivation for such work may be found in the need to protect SCADA systems and networks of sensors and actuators from interference with malicious agents through TCP/IP. If the sequences of messages sent from the SCADA system allows an attacker to know that the system, e.g., a power grid, is close to becoming unstable, then a sudden increase of load, e.g., a surge of power demand, can lead to disastrous consequences. However, until now the literature has dealt exclusively with finite transition systems. Approaches differ by considering either state-based opacity, e.g., initial-state opacity [18, 17] or current-state opacity [8] , or language-based opacity [1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 20, 21] . With state opacity, the secret predicate bears either upon the initial state, or upon the current state, or upon the set of all states that have been visited from the beginning of a run. With language opacity, the secret predicate is a set of sequences of actions that label transitions. Language opacity and current-state opacity are mutually reducible. Approaches also differ upon whether synthesis algorithms or closed formulas or both are provided for maximally permissive controllers enforcing opacity. Closed formulas are proposed in [2, 21, 20] . In fine, all approaches rely on Ramadge and Wonham's basic theory of supervisory control for DES [15, 14, 16] . Significant adaptations must, however, be brought to the basic theory, because opacity objectives do not reduce to safety and liveness. In fact, opacity objectives are not concerned with individual runs but with sets of indiscernible runs from the perspective of the attacker. Classes of indiscernible runs may be captured by estimators, as is usually done for the purpose of diagnosis. Closely related to the concept of opacity is the concept of secrecy (both a predicate and the complement of this predicate have to be kept secret). In [20] conditions under which secrecy can be ensured are provided. In [19] , controller synthesis algorithms are proposed for initial state-opacity and infinite-step opacity. Finally, although not specifically concerned with con-trol, the aim of [22] is to enforce opacity by inserting additional observable events in the system's output behavior.
In this paper, we lift the opacity enforcing control problem from finite transition systems to families of finite transition systems specified by modal transition systems. Modal transition systems were introduced in [9] as tuples (S, Σ, → , → ♦ , s 0 ) with two modal transition relations → (the strong or must transition relation) and → ♦ (the weak or may transition relation), both included in S×Σ×S and subject to the inclusion constraint → ⊆→ ♦ . A Modal Transition System (M T S) should be understood as a logical formula, with labelled transition systems as models. Modal transition systems are indeed a well-identified fragment of the modal µ-calculus [7] . Intuitively, a Labelled Transition System (LT S) is a model of an M T S if there exists a relation |= between their respective sets of states Q and S such that q 0 |= s 0 holds for the initial states and whenever q |= s, for q ∈ Q and s ∈ S, all must transitions from s are simulated by transitions from q, all transitions from q are simulated by may transitions from s and |= is preserved under simulation of transitions in both directions.
Example 1
The modal transition systems M 1 and M 2 depicted in Figure 1 , where the relations → and → ♦ are represented with solid lines and dashed lines, respectively, state that the presence of the first transition a is mandatory in any model of M 2 while it is optional in models of M 1 . The second transition a is optional for both MTS, and any model of M 1 or M 2 must be able to perform a b after the sequence a.a has been executed. The presence of a second transition b (returning to the initial state of
The two LTS depicted in Figure 1 (c) and 1(d) are models of M 1 , whereas they are not models of M 2 . Indeed, after the initial transition a, M 2 requires a transition b, which is missing in G 1 and G 2 .
We frequently use systems without an exact knowledge of their behaviour. This is generally the case when the system belongs to a range of products with many versions, such as applications for smart phones or software, and even more so for software with automatic updates. This is also the case when the system is a web service orchestration, selected on request by a broker to match operating guidelines specified in the request [11] . For instance, when you use a web service orchestration to buy goods online and find yourself short of funds to complete your transaction, you may want this information to be opaque to the orchestrator. Opacity may be obtained, e.g., by letting the online payment service interact with the orchestrator by the same return event when an incorrect PIN has been entered or when a bank account balance is too low for payment. In such situations, modal transition systems may serve to represent the partial knowledge of the user on the possible behaviours of the system (modal transition systems with final states, introduced in [4] , are in fact a restricted form of the operating guidelines of [11] ). Enforcing opacity of regular predicates on modal transition systems may then serve to prevent con- fidential user information from being leaked by the partially-unknown system which they actually use. The purpose of this paper differs from the purpose of our earlier paper [4] . In [4] , the goal was to enforce specifications of service, expressed by modal transition systems, on service providers, modelled by LTS. Here the goal is to enforce the opacity of a secret predicate on all models LT S of a modal transition system M T S.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we recall briefly the background of modal transition systems and supervisory control for opacity, and we state the opacity enforcement problem for modal transition systems. The parameters of the problem are the secret predicate, the subset of actions Σ a that the attacker can observe, and the subsets of actions Σ o and Σ c that the controller can observe and control, respectively. Then, we address the opacity enforcement problem for regular secrets in the most straightforward case Σ c ⊆ Σ o ⊆ Σ a = Σ. In the main and last technical section of the paper, we provide optimal and regular controllers that enforce the opacity of regular upper-closed secrets (Sec = Sec.Σ * ) for modal transition systems under the following assumptions:
Transition Systems and opacity
In this section we recall the background of labelled transition systems and opacity.
Labelled Transition Systems and their languages
A (finite) deterministic labelled transition system over Σ is a 4-tuple G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) where Q is a finite set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is an initial state, Σ is the alphabet of actions, and δ is a partial map from Q × Σ to Q, called the labelled transition map. This map is extended inductively to δ : Q×Σ * → Q by letting δ(q, ε) = q (where ε is the empty word) and δ(q, w.σ) = δ(δ(q, w), σ) for all q ∈ Q, w ∈ Σ * and σ ∈ Σ (w.σ denotes the word acquired by appending σ to w. In the sequel, we let w.w denote the concatenation of the words w and w and we let w.
A state q ∈ Q is reachable (from q 0 ) if δ(q 0 , w) = q for some word w ∈ Σ * . G is finite if Q and Σ are finite; it is reduced if all states in Q are reachable and every event σ ∈ Σ is enabled at some state q, i.e., δ(q, σ) is defined in this state. In the sequel, we consider only finite and reduced labelled transition systems. G is said to be complete if δ(q, σ) is defined for all q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ.
The language of G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) is the set of words
For q ∈ Q, we let L(G, q), the language generated by G from state q, be defined as:
For F ⊆ Q, we let L F (G), the set of sequences recognized by states in F , be defined as:
where π a is the operation from Σ * to Σ * a that erases in words of Σ * all events not in Σ a . Formally, π a is defined inductively by:
-π a (ε) = ε (the empty word), -π a (w.σ) = π a (w).σ for w ∈ Σ * and σ ∈ Σ a , -π a (w.σ) = π a (w) for w ∈ Σ * and σ / ∈ Σ a .
For w, w ∈ Σ * , we let w ∼ a w be an abbreviation for π a (w) = π a (w ). Finally, given transition systems G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) and G = (Q , Σ, δ , q 0 ) labelled over the same alphabet Σ, their product is the (reachable restriction of the) labelled transition system G × G = (Q × Q , Σ, δ × δ , (q 0 , q 0 )) where
Opacity
Consider an LTS G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) over Σ and Σ a ⊆ Σ. The alphabet Σ a ⊆ Σ defines the set of actions that the attacker can observe. Let Sec ⊆ Σ * be a regular predicate, called the secret, that represents confidential information on the execution of G. To catch this confidential information, the attacker is armed with full knowledge on the structure of G but only partial knowledge of its dynamic behavior, namely the information afforded by the natural projection on Σ * a of the actual sequence in Σ * generated by G. In this framework, we assume that the attacker passively observes the system and hence does not interact with it, i.e., the flow information is as follows:
For secret predicates given as regular languages, the definition of opacity introduced in [3] may be adapted as follows.
Intuitively, a secret is opaque if every secret word w is observationally equivalent to at least one non secret word w of the system. If Sec is not opaque then there is an information flow from the system to the attacker.
Example 2 Let G be the LTS of Figure 2 , where Σ = {h, p, a, b}, Σ a = {a, b}. The secret that should not be revealed is the occurrence of the (unobservable) action h (namely, Sec = Σ * .h.Σ * ). As h.b ∈ Sec is the sole word in L(G) compatible with the partial observation b, h.b discloses the secret Sec, hence Sec is not opaque w.r.t. G and Σ a .
Supervisory Control for Opacity
Given a Secret Sec on the system G, the goal of supervisory control is to enforce the secrecy of Sec on G by pairing this system with a supervisory controller modeled by an LTS that observes a subset Σ o of the actions in Σ and controls a subset Σ c of the actions in Σ following the scheme of Figure 3 . Thus, enforcing the opacity of the secret Sec w.r.t. Σ a in G means computing
Control Architecture a supervisory controller K such that Sec is opaque w.r.t. Σ a in the product G × K 1 , called the controlled system and usually written K/G. In Ramadge and Wonham's setting for supervisory control [15, 14, 16] , an admissible controller K may be seen as an LTS K = (X, Σ, δ K , x 0 ), subject to constraints parametric on two subsets of actions Σ c and Σ o .
1. Controllability constraint: the first set Σ c is comprised of the controllable actions that the controller can block or control. For any uncontrollable action σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c = Σ uc and for any word w, if δ K (x 0 , w) = x and wσ ∈ L(G) then δ K (x, σ) must be defined. In other words, we should have
Observability constraint: the second set Σ o is comprised of the actions that the controller can observe. For any action σ / ∈ Σ o and for any state
† is said to be maximally permissive among the controllers that enforce the opacity of
Next, we illustrate the (intuition behind the) computation of opacity enforcing controllers through a simple example. occurred and the secret is revealed (in state 5). By control, action c 1 has to be disabled, thus avoiding the triggering of the subsequent uncontrollable sequence h.d, and the LTS depicted in Figure 5 (a) is obtained. However, after the observation of the action b, the secret is now revealed to the attacker who knows the control law. By control, action c 2 has to be disabled, giving the LTS of Figure 5 (b). The secret is now opaque with respect to this LTS. The resulting controller K is depicted in Figure 5 (c).
The previous example suggests that to compute the controller K, it is sufficient to remove from G, using the standard Ramadge & Wonham algorithm, the sequences that reveal the secret, i.e. the language L(G) \ π
and to iterate the process until Sec is opaque w.r.t. the resulting LTS (iteration is mandatory as removing some behaviors of G by control might create new information flow). However, it has been shown in [5] that this iteration might not terminate, even though the maximally permissive controller K † exists. Furthermore, knowing whether the maximal controller is regular under the sole assumption that Σ c ⊆ Σ o is still an open question. Meanwhile, in [5] , it was shown that there exists a maximally permissive and regular controller K † in all cases where Σ c ⊆ Σ o and Σ a compares with Σ c and Σ o . In [6] , more elaborate constructions were presented for computing K † in the case where
Alternatively, [21] provides a method for computing the supremal controlled system ensuring the opacity of a secret Sec when
Note that [5] and [6] provide effective synthesis algorithms solving the opacity control problem (i.e., they compute the maximally permissive controller K † ), whereas [21] provides closed formulae characterizing the behavior K † /G without explicitly computing K † .
Remark 1 Closely related to the concept of opacity is the concept of secrecy (both a predicate and the complement of this predicate have to be kept secret).
In [20] conditions under which secrecy can be ensured are provided. Similarly, [19] provides algorithms to compute controllers ensuring initial-state opacity (preventing the attacker from inferring one of the initial states of the system after some observation) as well as infinite-step opacity (preventing the attacker from inferring that the system was in the secret in the past after some fixed number of steps).
Modal Transition Systems and opacity control problem
In this paper, we make a first step towards extending the results of section 2.3 to systems modeled by modal transition systems (MTS). We first introduce the formal definition of MTS and then describe the opacity control problem in this setting.
Modal Transition Systems [9]
Definition 3 A deterministic modal transition system (or MTS) over Σ is a 5-tuple M = (S, Σ, δ , δ ♦ , s 0 ) where -S is a finite set of logical states with s 0 the initial state, -Σ is the alphabet of actions -δ : S × Σ → S and δ ♦ : S × Σ → S are two partial maps, called the strong and the weak labelled transition maps, respectively, subject to the constraint δ ⊆ δ ♦ .
The maps δ and δ ♦ are extended inductively to words as was done with the transition maps of labelled transition systems. For any modal transition system M , we let L(M ) = L(M ) where M = (S, Σ, δ ♦ , s 0 ), thus M denotes the LTS whose transition map is the weak transition map of M . Similarly, M = (S, Σ, δ , s 0 ) denotes the LTS whose transition map is the strong transition map of M .
A modal transition system M determines a family of labelled transition systems G called its models (notation: G |= M T S).
Definition 4 A labelled transition system G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) is a model of M = (S, Σ, δ , δ ♦ , s 0 ) if there exists a relation |= ⊆ Q × S such that q 0 |= s 0 and for all q ∈ Q and s ∈ S, q |= s entails the following for all σ ∈ Σ:
is defined then δ(q, σ) is defined and δ(q, σ) |= δ (s, σ). With these definitions, it can be shown that
Therefore,
L(M ) and L(M ) are called the infimum and supremum of L(G), respectively, for all G |= M However, M and M are not the unique models of M with minimal or maximal language, respectively, since there may exist other LTS with the same language.
A central property of modal transition systems is stated by the following relation:
Furthermore, it can be shown that given two LTS G 1 and G 2 such that
This result holds because we only consider deterministic labelled transition systems.
We refer the reader to [9, 7] for more information on the theory of the modal transition systems.
In addition to these reminders, we introduce now a specific construction used in later proofs. Given a modal transition system M , for each word w ∈ L(M ) we want to construct a labelled transition system w • M such that L(w•M ) is the infimum of L(G) for all labelled transition systems G satisfying G |= M and w ∈ L(G).
-make n + 1 separate copies of the set of states S with elements (s, i), s ∈ S and 0 ≤ i ≤ n, Lemma 2 For any word w.σ ∈ L(M ) with w ∈ Σ * , σ ∈ Σ and δ ♦ (s 0 , w.σ) = s, the language of the labelled transition system (w.
Proof. In view of Lemma 1, it suffices to show that
and the proof is complete.
Based on Proposition 1, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Given Sec ∈ Reg(Σ * ) and w ∈ Sec, w discloses the secret Sec in some model G of M if and only if w discloses the secret Sec in w • M .
The Opacity Control Problem for Modal Transition Systems
From now on, M = (S, Σ, δ , δ ♦ , s 0 ) is a fixed modal transition system, and Sec is a fixed regular subset of Σ * , called the secret. Let Σ a be the subset of actions in Σ that can be observed by the attacker. Let Σ o and Σ c be the subsets of actions in Σ that may be observed or blocked by the controller, respectively. Definition 6 K = (X, Σ, δ K , x 0 ) enforces the opacity of Sec in M w.r.t. Σ a if for every labelled transition system G over Σ such that G |= M , 1. K is an admissible controller of G (w.r.t. Σ o and Σ c ) and, 2. Sec is opaque in K/G (w.r.t. Σ a ).
As for permissivity, it would not make any sense to require that K † be maximally permissive for every model G of M (among the controllers K that enforce the opacity of Sec in G w.r.t. Σ a ). In the framework of opacity control for modal transition systems, we shall consider the following definition:
for every controller K that enforces the opacity of Sec in M (w.r.t. Σ a ) and for every model G of M .
With regard to the above definitions, the opacity control problem can be stated as follows:
Problem 1 Given a modal transition system M , a regular secret Sec ⊆ Σ * , Σ a ⊆ Σ (the actions observed by the attacker), Σ o ⊆ Σ and Σ c ⊆ Σ (the observable and controllable actions of the controller, respectively), build a maximally permissive controller K † enforcing the opacity of Sec in M w.r.t. Σ a .
Let us illustrate the opacity control problem and the notion of permissivity through an example:
Example 6 Consider the MTS M 1 of Example 1 and assume that the secret is given by the regular language Sec = Σ * .a.a.b.b.Σ * and that Σ a = Σ c = {a}. Sec is opaque w.r.t. G 2 and Σ a but not opaque w.r.t. G 1 and Σ a since by observing a.a.a.a, the attacker knows that the actual word executed is either a.a.b.b.a.a or a.a.b.b.a.a.b , both of which are in Sec. Now let us consider the controller K depicted in Figure 7 . It can be shown that K is an admissible has not be observed so far. However, the controller K is not the maximally permissive controller enforcing the opacity of Sec in G 2 , as Sec was already opaque for G 2 . Overall, as the controller does not know whether the actual plant is G 1 or G 2 (although the attacker knows it), the controller has to always disable the fourth a in the word a.a.b.b.a.a.
The previous example illustrates the fact that if the controller does not know which model of M is actually implemented whereas the attacker does know, then the controller must enforce opacity of Sec uniformly in all such models of M .
In the following section, we address the case in which a maximally permissive and regular controller K † enforcing the opacity of Sec in M can be constructed.
Computing K † for regular upper-closed secrets
There is a somewhat trivial case to consider when the attacker has full observation of the system (i.e., Σ c ⊆ Σ o ⊆ Σ a = Σ). In this case we simply compute, in accordance with Ramadge and Wonham's theory [15, 14, 16] , the maximally permissive K † for M and the expected behaviour L(M ) \ Sec. In this section, we assume that the secret Sec is upper-closed w.r.t. the prefix-order on words, i.e., Sec = Sec.Σ * . That is, once the secret is disclosed, it is disclosed forever. This assumption, also made in [1] , implies that the goal of the opacity game is not to permit the attacker to ascertain that some prefix of the partially observed run of the LTS was in the secret. We make other two alternative working assumptions.
Under these assumptions, the attacker has partial observation, whereas the controller has full observation and can block every action that (1) reveals (i.e., all controllable events are observable) or (2) enters the secret (i.e., an event that would allow access to the secret can always be disabled). This gives a strong advantage to the controller over the attacker, but remember that the controller ignores which LTS is executing among all models of the given MTS, whereas the attacker knows.
Incorporating the secret with the modal transition system
As a first step towards computing controllers, we incorporate the predicate Sec with the modal transition system M . To do so, we combine the modal transition system M = (S, Σ, δ , δ ♦ , s 0 ) and the secret Sec into a modal transition system M # , with distinguished logical states representing the intersection of L(M ) and the complement of Sec.
First, one constructs a complete deterministic LTS A = (Y, Σ, δ A , y 0 ) and a subset of states Y F ⊆ Y recognizing Sec from the initial state y 0 , i.e., The complete deterministic automaton A that recognizes Sec is given in Figure 9 with Y F = {5}, In the remainder of Section 4, we assume without loss of generality, and for simplicity of notation, that M = M # and we let
F if the latter is defined.
The general schema
In this section, we sketch the intuitions under the methods that will be employed for solving Problem 1. Following Definitions 6 and 7, our aim is to compute the maximally permissive controller K such that the secret is opaque with respect to K/G and Σ a for every LTS G |= M .
is the supremum of L(G) for all labelled transition systems G |= M , in order that a controller K may be admissible for every model G of M , it is necessary and sufficient that L(K) satisfies the controllability constraint w.r.t. L(M ) and Σ c (Section 2.3) , i.e., w.σ ∈ L(M ) ⇒ w.σ ∈ L(K) for any word w ∈ L(M ) ∩ L(K) and for any uncontrollable action σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c . Note that, as the controller has full observation (Σ o = Σ), the observability constraint (Section 2.3) is necessary satisfied. When the controllability constraint is satisfied, we say that K is an admissible controller of M (w.r.t. Σ c and Σ o = Σ).
Among the admissible controllers of M , we should search for controllers K ensuring the opacity of the secret, i.e., such that the following condition holds for every labelled transition system G |= M (recall that K/G denotes the product of G and K):
We want to compute the maximally permissive controller K satisfying this condition. We proceed in two steps.
-In a first step, we derive from
. The set of states of H is included in S × P(S), where P(S) denotes the power set of S. The meaning of these states is as follows. If δ ♦ (s 0 , w) = s in M , then w leads in H to the state (s, E) defined by
-In a second step, we trim H according to Ramadge and Wonham's procedure to avoid reaching any state (s, E), where E ⊆ S F .
We will show that the labelled transition system K † obtained in this way is the maximally permissive controller that enforces the opacity of Sec in M .
A preliminary construction
In the sequel,
, and the set Σ ua = Σ \ Σ a denotes the set of actions which are unobservable from the perspective of the attacker. For all transition maps δ, for all sets of states E and for all L ⊆ Σ * , we let
Definition 8 Let H = (Θ, Σ, δ H , θ 0 ) be the LTS with the set of states Θ ⊆ S × P(S) (where P(S) denotes the powerset of S) and the labelled transition map δ H jointly and inductively defined as follows:
• inductively, for each state (s, E) ∈ Θ and for each action σ ∈ Σ such that δ ♦ (s, σ) is defined, let δ H ((s, E), σ) = (s , E ) and (s , E ) ∈ Θ where s = δ ♦ (s, σ) and the set of states E is given according to the case by:
Obviously, L(H) = L(M ) (because we inductively define s = δ ♦ (s, σ) when computing δ H ), and s ∈ E for every state (s, E) ∈ Θ.
Example 8 To illustrate the construction of H, let us turn our attention to the MTS depicted in Figure 10 with Σ a = {a}. The LTS derived from this MTS according to Definition 8 is depicted in Figure 11 , where states (s, {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n }) are represented as pairs s, s 1 .s 2 · · · s n . The following lemma, which is a bit technical, shows that the above construction achieves the goals announced in section 4.2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on w. The base of the induction is given by the case w = ε.
ua ⇔ w ∼ a ε, and δ (s 0 , w ) is defined if and only if w ∈ L(M ) = L(ε • M ) (Lemma 1). As δ ♦ (s 0 , w ) = δ (s 0 , w ) if the latter is defined, the lemma holds for w = ε.
Assume now that the lemma holds for w = σ 1 . . . σ n−1 (by convention, n = 1 means w = ε), and consider w.σ n ∈ L(M ) with σ n ∈ Σ. Let δ H (θ 0 , σ 1 . . . σ i ) = (s i , E i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As s n = δ ♦ (s n−1 , σ n ) (by Def. 8) and s n−1 = δ ♦ (s 0 , w) (by the induction hypothesis), s n = δ ♦ (s 0 , w.σ n ). To simplify the notation, let σ = σ n and s = s n , hence s = δ ♦ (s 0 , w.σ).
Case σ / ∈ Σ a . By Def. 8, E n = E n−1 ∪ δ (s, Σ * ua ), and by induction,
, it suffices to prove: ♦ (s o , w ) for some w ∈ w.σ.L(M , s) satisfying w ∼ a w.σ. Therefore, the lemma holds in this case.
Case σ ∈ Σ a . By Def. 8, 
Enforcing the opacity of the secret Sec in all models of M amounts therefore to barring access to bad states of H, i.e., to states in
holds for all models G of M is and only if it holds for L(H), hence a controller K is an admissible controller of all models G of M if and only if it is an admissible controller of H.
So, in order for K = (X, Σ, δ K , x 0 ) to enforce the opacity of the secret Sec in every model G of M (w.r.t. Σ a ) and to be an admissible controller of G (w.r.t. Σ c ), it is necessary that the following two conditions hold:
According to Ramadge and Wonham's theory of state-based supervision, the maximally permissive controller K † for which both conditions hold is obtained by pruning H iteratively. Throughout the iteration, one maintains a partition {Good, Bad} of the set of states X = Θ and a partial transition map δ X : Θ × Σ → Θ. Good decreases and Bad increases while δ X gets less and less defined at each step. The algorithm is at follows: -Initially, Good 0 = X \ Bad 0 and δ X = δ H . -at step n + 1 in the iteration:
-initially, one lets Bad n+1 = Bad n , -for all pairs of arguments θ ∈ Good n and σ ∈ Σ such that δ X (θ, σ) ∈ Bad n : • one removes (θ, σ) from the domain of definition of δ X , • if σ is uncontrollable (σ / ∈ Σ c ), then one adds the considered state θ to the set Bad n+1 , -finally, one lets Good n+1 = X \ Bad n+1 , -the global iteration stops when δ X (θ, σ) ∈ Bad n for no pair of arguments θ ∈ Good n and σ ∈ Σ,
At termination of the algorithm, let Good = Good n and Bad = X \ Good n , then K † is the induced restriction of the LTS (Good, Σ, δ X , θ 0 ) on the states reachable from θ 0 .
-If θ 0 / ∈ Good, then no controller can prevent Bad states from being reached (hence no controller can enforce the opacity of the secret in all models of M T S).
-If θ 0 ∈ Good, then K † is the maximally permissive controller preventing states in Bad 0 from being reached in H.
However, this does not entail directly that K † enforces the opacity of the secret in all models of M T S, since (C 1 ) and (C 2 ) were only necessary conditions for achieving this goal. The following lemma is crucial to prove that K † enforces indeed the opacity of the secret in all models of M T S.
Lemma 5 If the iterative procedure defined above is applied to the LTS H specified by Definition 8 and to the set Bad
F for every state (s, E) of H that is eventually turned to Bad.
Proof. -We consider first the case where Σ a ⊆ Σ c . We show that in this case, the set Bad stays equal to Bad 0 . At step n+1 in the iteration, assume by induction on n that Bad n = Bad 0 , and let δ H ((s, E), σ) = (s , E ) for some σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c and (
F entails s ∈ S F for every state (s, E) ∈ Bad = Bad 0 .
-We consider next the case where Σ a , Σ c ⊆ Σ o = Σ and wσ ∈ Sec ⇒ w ∈ Sec for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c , i.e., δ ♦ (s, σ) ∈ S F ⇒ s ∈ S F for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c . At step n + 1 in the iteration, let δ H ((s, E), σ) = (s , E ) for some σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c and (s , E ) ∈ Bad n . By induction on n, assume that s ∈ S F . As δ ♦ (s, σ) = s and σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c , necessarily, s ∈ S F . Therefore, the proof of the lemma is complete. δ H ((s, E) , σ) = (s , E ) for σ ∈ Σ c \ Σ a then E ⊆ E by Def. 8, hence (s , E ) ∈ Bad 0 ⇒ (s, E) ∈ Bad 0 . Therefore, actions σ in Σ c \ Σ a are never blocked by K † .
Remark 2 If
Remark 3 It may occur, for some state (s, E) of K † and for some s ∈ E that K † has no state of the form (s , E ). In such a case, some state (s , E ) of H must have been turned to Bad, hence s ∈ S F by Lemma 5. Therefore, E ∩ (S \ S F ) =(E \ {s }) ∩ (S \ S F ). This explains why we do not need to update the second component of a state (s, E) during Ramadge and Wonham's iterative cleaning process.
Proposition 2 K
† enforces the opacity of the secret Sec in all models G of M .
Proof. Let G |= M and w ∈ L(K † /G). We must show that there exists w ∈ L(K † /G) such that w ∼ a w and δ ♦ (s 0 , w ) / ∈ S F (in M ). As w ∈ L(K † ), δ H (θ 0 , w) must be a Good state, hence δ H (θ 0 , w) / ∈ Bad 0 ⊆ Bad. By Lemma 4 and the definition of the set Bad 0 , w ∼ a w and δ ♦ (s 0 , w ) / ∈ S F for some w ∈ L(w • M ). As G |= M and w ∈ L(G), by proposition 1, w ∈ L(G). As the secret Sec is an upper-closed set, δ ♦ (s 0 , w ) / ∈ S F entails δ ♦ (s 0 , v ) / ∈ S F for every prefix v of w . By Lemma 5, δ H (s 0 , v ) is never turned from Good to Bad for any prefix v of w . Therefore, w ∈ L(K † ), and w ∈ L(K † /G).
Theorem 1 K † is maximally permissive among all admissible controllers enforcing the opacity of the secret in all models of M .
Proof. K
† is maximally permissive among the controllers of H that satisfy the two necessary conditions (C 1 ) and (C 2 ). Proposition 2 completes the proof of the theorem. (Figure 1(a) ) and in particular in G 1 (Figure 1(c) ) and G 2 (Figure 1(d) ). The controlled systems K † /G 1 and K † /G 2 are depicted in Figure 8 . Example 10 Consider the modal transition system M 2 (Figure 1(b) ). Given the secret Sec = Σ * .a.a.b.b.Σ * recognized by the automaton depicted in Figure 9 , the corresponding M is like that in Figure 10 −→ 9 are now strong transitions. As before, S F = {6, 7, 8, 9}. The transition system H computed from M 2 and the secret Sec is shown in Figure 13 . As Bad 0 is the set of states (s, E) such that E ⊆ S F , Bad 0 = ∅. Therefore K † = H. As L(H) = L(M 2 ), this means that the secret Sec is opaque in every model G of M 2 and no additional control is needed.
